“Which Religion Is True?”
On faith, knowledge and methodological agnosticism
Charles Darwin was a scientist and a Christian. In 1873, a young Dutch admirer, Nicolaas Doedes, wrote and asked him a religious question: “I should like so very much to know, on what grounds you believe in God.” Darwin answered, “The safest conclusion seems to be that the whole subject is beyond the scope of man’s intellect….” Was Darwin a theist, believing in the existence of God, or an agnostic, not knowing whether God exists? The best answer is “both.” As a Christian he believed in God. As a scientist, he recognized that his faith was not supported in the same way that his science was. He was a personal theist and a professional agnostic.
Knowledge and faith
Knowledge is not the same as faith. It meets higher standards than opinion. You do not ”know” about a view just because you believe or feel that it is true. Knowledge is a name for what passes specific tests of evidence and support. Faith is believing even when you don’t have the kind of evidence that counts as knowledge. That makes faith vitally important. But it does not make faith equal knowledge.
Asking whether religious beliefs are true muddies the water. A different question is more important: “what types of support do people appeal to in order to count a belief as ‘knowledge’?” What is the threshold of knowledge? One useful philosophical definition of knowledge is “justified, true belief.” This highlights a key point: different groups, religions and professions have different ideas about justification, about what counts as good evidence. So, they have different ideas about what counts as knowledge.
When we talk to people about their complex beliefs, or when we study those beliefs, it is useful to first talk about criteria of knowledge. These beliefs about beliefs can help avoid fruitless discussion of divergent beliefs themselves. If I read my future in tea leaves, it is more productive to ask me why I believe in predicting the future than to question specific predictions.
Christians vs. historians
Here is an example. Christians have a longer list of beliefs about Jesus than historians do. This is not a zero-sum struggle between two views, only one of which can reflect reality. It just reflects different ideas of what counts as knowledge.
Setting aside differences between Christianities, Christians know many things about Jesus: he fulfilled Old Testament prophecy, was born of a virgin, was God incarnate and the son of God, performed miracles, preached the Kingdom, taught ethical virtues, died on the cross for the sins of all humanity, was resurrected from the dead, will come again to rule at the end of time, was fully human and divine son, is the second person of the Trinity etc.
For historians, Jesus was born in northern Palestine, had a group of followers and taught them, was believed to heal and cast out demons, and was tried and executed by the Roman Authorities. That’s it.
Christians have a longer list of beliefs about Jesus because they count what the Bible says as evidence for (definitively true) knowledge. (The main reason that there are so many types of Christianity, especially Protestantisms, is because “what the Bible says” comes down to “how the Bible is interpreted.”) Some Christians have additional criteria of truth: for example, the teachings of a charismatic leader (usually presented as the true reading of the Bible); personal religious experiences or revelations; the authority of church traditions; the writings of the early Church Fathers; or the testimonies of saints and martyrs. If you have a longer list of criteria of ‘knowledge,’ the list of things you ‘know’ increases.
Historians have a higher (not better) threshold for deciding what they count as (very probably true) knowledge. The crucial criterion here is having historical sources outside the texts of a religious community. What early Christian texts tell us may or may not be true, but it does not count as solid historical evidence. There is independent, non-Christian, historically acceptable evidence for only a few details about Jesus: for example, direct evidence from archaeology and the writings of the Jewish historian Josephus; indirect evidence from Roman coins that tell us the dates that Pontius Pilate was in Judea; and internal criteria like consistency of sources and critical evaluation of bias in those sources. Historians’ shorter list of criteria of knowledge is not ‘better’ in any universal sense. It is just better for doing history.
How do we decide who is right? The discussion goes nowhere if Christians and historians just assert their different sets of beliefs. Keep in mind that many historians, comparable to Darwin, wear one knowledge-hat for their personal beliefs and a different one for their professional work. Looking at different perspectives on knowledge is essential for good comparative work.
Methodological agnosticism
A certain specific type of agnosticism is central to the study of religions. Methodological agnosticism involves a narrow view of criteria of knowledge, as a technique of professional scholarship. As with historians, the method of study is to accept as knowledge only what meets the academic threshold of evidence. That leaves out a lot of things that the people we study believe. Scholars of religions do not assume that religious views are true or false (that is the “agnosticism” part): they try to understand and analyze religious beliefs and practices from a neutral standpoint. Perfect neutrality is an illusion, of course, but this conventional, professional line goes a long way to treating religions on an equal footing. And that makes comparisons better. This neutrality is different from the historian's focus on what is "very probably true." Scholars of religions are interested in the difference that beliefs make to the world, not in whether they are true or not.
Methodological agnosticism side-steps the need to verify supernatural claims. Scholars of religions look at observable practices, physical spaces and artifacts, forms of social affiliation, cultural contexts, institutional structures, the historical effects of religious beliefs etc. They ask how beliefs function within a religious community, or what social, ethical, ideological or psychological roles they play. They do not weigh in on debates about the truth of religious beliefs.
Many scholars take a confused approach to methodological agnosticism. They emphasize the importance of remaining agnostic about what exists. Atheist George H Smith divided agnostics into two types: agnostic theists, who believe that a deity probably exists, and agnostic atheists, who believe that a deity probably doesn’t exist. This emphasis on what exists gets in the way of studying religions: that is not a helpful type of agnosticism. Methodological agnosticism means choosing a short list of criteria of knowledge that allows you to assess the impacts and functions of religious belief and practices, without getting into the issue of assessing what is true or false. Why take the extra step of defining ‘truth’ in terms of beliefs matching reality? The emphasis on ontology, on what exists or not, is unnecessary and distracting. There is no need to open that philosophical can of worms.
This focus on existence leads to prejudice against religions, as if talking about gods, spirits and afterlives is somehow less grounded, real, important or serious than talking about other abstract ideas. Do retributive justice, the social contract, the invisible hand, alienation, the unconscious or dialectical materialism exist in some more tangible or real way than original sin, nirvana, karma or the Holy Spirit? Do they exist as things out there in the world that we can see, hear or feel? Or do we understand them by looking at what people believe about them, how each concept connects to others, how each idea makes a practical difference in the world when people take them seriously and act on them?
Keep your eye on the ball
The Ndyuka people in Suriname (an Africa-rooted Maroon culture, descendants of former enslaved people) believe that their Elders are in contact with the community’s departed ancestors. The ancestors continue to guide the community from beyond the grave. Scholars of religions try to make sense of what people believe and what difference those beliefs make in their lives. They remains agnostic about whether those beliefs are true or not, in this case not asking whether the Ndyuka ancestors exist or not. What matters are the roles that religious beliefs play in their culture.
The take-home point in discussions of faith, knowledge and methodological agnosticism is that we should pay more attention to criteria of knowledge, and spend less time getting lost in the details of what people believe. If we search for the truth of beliefs – or, worse, if we start wondering what truly exists – we get lost in a shell game. Staying focused on how people justify their beliefs is more useful for comparing religions – and for comparing belief systems in general.